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A 'streamlined' (Commission's 
description) proposal for a thirteenth 
directive on takeovers has been put 
forward by the European Commission 
(OJ 1997 C378/10, COM(97)565 
final-96/0341(COD)).
The major differences that the 
framework structure seem to have made 
are:
(1) The mandatory bid is no longer 
treated as the only means to protect 
minority shareholders
(2) Changes have been made to the 
description of the supervisory body
(3) The extent of court intervention is 
addressed.
The issue discussed here is the extent 
of possible court intervention in a bid.
DIRECTIVE'S PROVISIONS
The directive specifically provides for a 
Datafin -type solution by reserving:
"... the power which courts may have in a 
member state to decline to hear legal 
proceedings and to decide whether or not such 
proceedings affect the outcome of the bid' (art. 
4 (5)).
The only requirement is that an 
injured party should enjoy adequate 
remedies.
In R v Panel on Takeover and Mergers, ex 
pane Datafin pic S^Anor (1987) 3 BCC 10 
the court held that the decisions of the 
city panel on takeovers and mergers was 
subject to judicial review. However, in 
order to deter tactical litigation a litiganto o
must first seek leave before applying for
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review, and the panel's decisions are to be 
treated as binding unless and until set 
aside. It is clear that both these 
safeguards are expressly preserved by the 
current draft.
DTI INTERPRETATION
In the Department of Trade and 
Industry's (DTI) consultation document 
on the draft directive, Datafin is 
presented as if the court ruled out 
remedies other than a declaration:
'In the context of the panel's power to grant 
dispensation from the operation of the rules, the 
court said that the exercise oJ the power could 
be attacked only in exceptional circumstances 
and, even then, the court indicated that the 
appropriate remedy would be a declaration'.
In fact the court did not seek to fetter 
its discretion in future exceptional 
circumstances, speaking only of its 
'expectations'. This obviously leaves it 
open for court intervention in 
exceptional circumstances. The relevant 
passage reads:
T should expect the relationship between the 
panel and the court to be historic rather than 
contemporaneous. I should expect the court to 
allow contemporary decisions to take their 
course, considering the complaint and 
intervening, if at all, later and in retrospect by 
declaratory orders which would enable the panel 
not to repeat any error and would relieve 
individuals of the disciplinary consequences of 
any erroneous finding of breach of the rules.'
The use of the term 'expectation' 
clearly leaves an unexpected, extreme 
position to be dealt with as the court sees 
fit. The DTI's contention that:
'The change of legal status of the code might 
oblige a court to take a less restrictive view of its 
role in relation to judicial review'
is therefore suspect. So too is the view 
that judicial review on the basis of non- 
implementation of the directive might 
cause problems. In view of the wide 
discretion afforded to the member state 
and the regulatory authority, such a 
situation is difficult to envisage and, if it 
did arise, would be a situation so extreme 
that the court might well be persuaded to 
interfere under the present Datafin 
regime.
The DTI remain unimpressed. In an 
explanatory memorandum dated 19 
March 1996 the directive is attacked on 
the grounds that 'the introduction of 
tactical litigation' would cause problems 
and the directive:
'would alter the legal basis of takeover 
regulation in the UK, thereby making it easier 
for parties to challenge decisions throughout the 
courts and to engage in tactical litigation.'
There seems to be little basis for these 
assertions. Despite this, these misgivings 
were echoed by many of those giving 
evidence to the House of Lords' 
European Community committee, with 
the notable exception of the financial law 
panel.
EUROPEAN RIGHT
A further argument is that the right 
under European law to an 'adequate 
remedy' could provide scope for 
litigation during the bid on the ground 
that compensation would not be an 
adequate remedy. This argument requires 
a tortuous reading of the directive, which
o
appears to provide that the right to claim 
compensation will be an adequate 
remedy, whilst reserving the {bowers of 
the courts to permit the supervisory 
authority to complete its work on the bid 
itself. The DTI paragraph continues:
'Where compensation is not appropriate the 
courts may feel compelled to intervene by way oJ 
injunction or other preliminary relief.'
So they might; but the cases will be 
very rare and the position is an exact 
description of the present situation under
Datafin.
The DTI document also questions who 
would be liable to pay compensation. The 
directive 'does not make it clear'. It does 
not need to be clear. The directive is 
concerned with the provision of an 
adequate remedy, not who is to be the 
defendant, which is therefore a matter 
for member states. ©
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